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ABSTRACT
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive which obfus-
cates the access paerns to a storage thereby preventing privacy
leakage. So far in the current literature, only ‘fully functional’
ORAMs are widely studied which can protect, at a cost of consider-
able performance penalty, against the strong adversaries who can
monitor all read and write operations. However, recent research
has shown that information can still be leaked even if only the
write access paern (not reads) is visible to the adversary. For such
weaker adversaries, a fully functional ORAM turns out to be an
overkill causing unnecessary overheads. Instead, a simple ‘write-
only’ ORAM is sucient, and, more interestingly, is preferred as it
can oer far more performance and energy eciency than a fully
functional ORAM.
In this work, we present Flat ORAM: an ecient write-only
ORAM scheme which outperforms the closest existing write-only
ORAM called HIVE. HIVE suers from performance bolenecks
while managing the memory occupancy information vital for cor-
rectness of the protocol. Flat ORAM resolves these bolenecks
by introducing a simple idea of Occupancy Map (OccMap) which
eciently manages the memory occupancy information resulting
in far beer performance. Our simulation results show that, on av-
erage, Flat ORAM only incurs a moderate slowdown of 3× over the
insecure DRAM for memory intensive benchmarks among Splash2
and 1.6× for SPEC06. Compared to HIVE, Flat ORAM oers 50%
performance gain on average and up to 80% energy savings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
User’s data privacy concerns in computation outsourcing to cloud
servers have gained serious aention over the past couple of
decades. To address this challenge, various trusted-hardware
based secure processor architectures have been proposed includ-
ing TPM [1, 34, 42], Intel’s TPM+TXT [16], eXecute Only Memory
(XOM) [21–23], Aegis [39, 40], Ascend [11], Phantom [25] and
,
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Intel’s SGX [26]. A trusted-hardware platform receives user’s en-
crypted data, which is decrypted and computed upon inside the
trusted boundary, and nally the encrypted results of the computa-
tion are sent to the user.
Although all the data stored outside the secure processor’s
trusted boundary, e.g. in the main memory, can be encrypted,
information can still be leaked to an adversary through the access
paerns to the stored data [50]. In order to prevent such leakage,
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a well established technique, rst pro-
posed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [12]. ORAM obfuscates the
memory access paern by introducing several randomized ‘redun-
dant’ accesses, thereby preventing privacy leakage at a cost of
signicant performance penalty. Intense research over the last few
decades has resulted in more and more ecient and secure ORAM
schemes [6, 8, 9, 13–15, 29, 30, 35–37, 43, 48, 49].
A key observation regarding the adversarial model assumed by
the current renowned ORAM techniques is that the adversary is
capable of learning ne-grained information of all the accesses
made to the memory. is includes the information about which
location is accessed, the type of operations (read/write), and the
time of the access. It is an extremely strong adversarial model
which, in most cases, requires direct physical access to the memory
address bus in order to monitor both read and write accesses, e.g.
the case of a curious cloud server.
On the other hand, for purely remote adversaries (where the
cloud server itself is trusted), direct physical access to the memory
address bus is not possible thereby preventing them from directly
monitoring read/write access paerns. Such remote adversaries,
although weaker than adversaries having physical access, can still
“learn” the application’s write access paerns. Interestingly, privacy
leakage is still possible even if the adversary is able to infer just the
write access paerns of an application.
John et al. demonstrated such an aack [27] on the famous
Montgomery’s ladder technique [19] commonly used for modular
exponentiation in public key cryptography. In this aack, a 512-bit
secret key is correctly inferred in just 3.5 minutes by only mon-
itoring the application’s write access paern via a compromised
Direct Memory Access (DMA1) [3–5, 24, 31] device on the system.
e adversary collects the snapshots of the application’s memory
via the compromised DMA. Clearly, any two memory snapshots
only dier in the locations where the data has been modied in
the laer snapshot. In other words, comparing the snapshots not
only reveals the fact that write accesses (if any) have been made to
the memory, but it also reveals the exact locations of the accesses
which leads to a precise access paern of memory writes resulting
in privacy leakage.
1DMA is a standard performance feature which grants full access of the main memory
to certain peripheral buses, e.g. FireWire, underbolt etc.
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Recent work [38] demonstrated that DMA aacks can also be
launched remotely by injecting malware to the dedicated hardware
devices, such as graphic processors and network interface cards,
aached to the host platform. is allows even a remote adversary
to learn the application’s write access paern. Intel’s TXT has also
been a victim of DMA based aacks where a malicious OS directed
a network card to access data in the protected VM [44, 45].
One approach to prevent such aacks, as adapted by TXT, could
be to block certain DMA accesses through modications in DRAM
controller. However, this requires the DRAM controller to be in-
cluded in the trusted computing base (TCB) of the system which is
undesirable. Nevertheless, there could potentially be many scenar-
ios other than DMA based aacks where write access paerns can
be learned by the adversary.
Current so-called fully functional ORAM schemes, which obfus-
cate both read and write access paerns, also oer a solution to
such weaker adversaries. However, the added protection (obfusca-
tion of reads) oered by fully functional ORAMs is unnecessary
and is practically an overkill in this scenario which results in sig-
nicant performance penalty. Path ORAM [37], the most ecient
and practical fully functional ORAM system for secure processors
so far, still incurs about 2 − 10× performance degradation [11, 32]
over an insecure DRAM system. A far more ecient solution to
this problem is a write-only ORAM scheme, which only obfuscates
the write accesses made to the memory. Since read accesses leave
no trace in the memory snapshot and hence do not need to be
obfuscated in this model, a write-only ORAM can oer signicant
performance advantage over a fully functional ORAM.
A recent work, HIVE [2], has proposed a write-only ORAM
scheme for implementing hidden volumes in hard disk drives. e
key idea is similar to Path ORAM, i.e., each data block is wrien to
a new random location, along with some dummy blocks, every time
it is accessed. However, a fundamental challenge that arises in this
scheme is to avoid collisions. I.e., to determine whether a randomly
chosen physical location contains real or dummy data, in order to
avoid overwriting the existing useful data block. HIVE proposes
a complex inverse position map approach for collision avoidance.
Essentially, it maintains a forward position mapping (logical to
physical blocks) and a backward/inverse position mapping (phys-
ical to logical blocks) for the whole memory. Before each write,
both forward and backward mappings are looked up to determine
whether the corresponding physical location is vacant or occupied.
is approach, however, turns out to be a storage and performance
boleneck because of the size of inverse position map and dual
lookups of the position mappings.
A simplistic and obvious solution to this long-standing prob-
lem, from a computer architect’s perspective, would be to use a
bit-mask to mark each physical block as vacant or occupied. Based
on this intuition, we propose a simplied write-only ORAM scheme
called Flat ORAM2. At the core of the algorithm, Flat ORAM in-
troduces a new data structure called Occupancy Map (OccMap): a
bit-mask which oers an ecient collision avoidance mechanism.
e OccMap records the availability information (occupied/vacant)
2Flat ORAM replaces the binary tree structure of Path ORAM with a at array of data
blocks; hence termed as ‘Flat’ ORAM.
of every physical location in a highly compressed form (i.e., just 1-
bit per cache line). For typical parameter seings, OccMap is about
25× compact compared to HIVE’s inverse position map structure.
is dense structure allows the OccMap blocks to exploit higher
locality, resulting in considerable performance gain. While naively
storing the OccMap breaks the ORAM’s security, we present how
to securely store and manage this structure in a real system. In
particular, the paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We are the rst ones to implement an existing write-only
ORAM scheme, HIVE, in the context of secure processors
with all state-of-the-art ORAM optimizations, and analyze
its performance bolenecks.
(2) A simple write-only ORAM, named Flat ORAM, having
an ecient collision avoidance approach is proposed. e
micro-architecture of the scheme is discussed in detail
and the design space is comprehensively explored. It has
also been shown to seamlessly adopt various performance
optimizations of its predecessor: Path ORAM.
(3) Our simulation results show that, on average, Flat ORAM
oers 50% performance gain (up to 75% for DBMS) over
HIVE, and only incurs slowdowns of 3× and 1.6× over the
insecure DRAM for memory bound Splash2 and SPEC06
benchmarks respectively.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
our adversarial model in detail along with a practical example from
the current literature. Section 3 provides the necessary background
of fully functional ORAMs and write-only ORAMs. e proposed
Flat ORAM scheme along with its security analysis is presented
in Section 4, and the detailed construction of its occupancy map
structure is shown in Section 5. A few additional optimizations from
literature implemented in Flat ORAM are discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 evaluates Flat ORAM’s performance, and we conclude
the paper in Section 8.
2 ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We assume a relaxed form of the adversarial model considered in
several prior works related to fully functional oblivious RAMs in
secure processor seings [9, 32, 48].
In our model, a user’s computation job is outsourced to a cloud,
where a trusted processor performs the computation on user’s pri-
vate data. e user’s private data is stored (in encrypted form) in
the untrusted memory external to the trusted processor, i.e. DRAM.
In order to compute on user’s private data, the trusted processor
interacts with DRAM. e cloud service itself is not considered
as an adversary, i.e. it does not try to infer any information from
the memory access paerns of the user’s program. However, since
the cloud serves several users at the same time, sharing of critical
resources such as DRAM among various applications from dier-
ent users is inevitable. Among these users being served by the
cloud service, we assume a malicious user who is able to monitor
remotely (and potentially learn the secret information from) the
data write sequences of other users’ applications to the DRAM, e.g.,
by taking frequent snapshots of the victim application’s memory
via a compromised DMA. Moreover, he may also tamper with the
DRAM contents or play replay aacks in order to manipulate other
users’ applications and/or learn more about their secret data.
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To protect the system from such an adversary, we add to the
processor chip a Write-Only ORAM controller : an additional trusted
hardware module. Now all the o-chip trac goes to DRAM
through the ORAM controller. In order to formally dene the
security properties satised by our ORAM controller, we adapt the
write-only ORAM privacy denition from [17] as follows:
Denition 2.1. (Write-OnlyORAMPrivacy) For every two log-
ical access sequences A1 and A2 of innite length, their correspond-
ing (innite length) probabilistic access sequences ORAM(A1) and
ORAM(A2) are identically distributed in the following sense: For
all positive integers n, if we truncate ORAM(A1) and ORAM(A2)
to their rst n accesses, then the truncations [ORAM(A1)]n and
[ORAM(A2)]n are identically distributed.
In other words, memory snapshots only reveal to the adversary
the timing of write accesses made to the memory (i.e. leakage
over ORAM Timing Channel) instead of their precise access pat-
tern, whereas no trace of any read accesses made to the memory
is revealed to the adversary. An important aspect of Denition 2.1
to note is that it completely isolates the problem of leakage over
ORAM Termination Channel from ORAM’s originally targeted prob-
lem (which is also targeted in this paper) i.e., preventing leakage
over memory address channel. Notice that the original denition of
ORAM [12] does not protect against timing aacks, i.e. it does not
obfuscate when an access is made to the memory (ORAM Timing
Channel) or how long it takes for the application to nish (ORAM
Termination Channel). e write-only ORAM security denition
followed by HIVE [2] also allows leakage over ORAM termina-
tion channel, as two memory access sequences generated by the
ORAM for two same-length logical access sequences can have dif-
ferent lengths [17]. erefore, in order to dene precise security
guarantees oered by our ORAM, we follow Denition 2.1.
Periodic ORAMs [11] deterministically make ORAM accesses
always at regular predened (publicly known) intervals, thereby
preventing leakage over ORAM timing channel and shiing it to the
ORAM termination channel. We present a periodic variant of our
write-only ORAM to protect leakage over ORAM timing channel.
Following the prior works [25] [9], (a) we assume that the timing
of individual DRAM accesses made during an ORAM access does
not reveal any information; (b) we do not protect the leakage over
ORAM termination channel (i.e. total number of ORAM or DRAM
accesses). e problem of leakage over ORAM termination channel
has been addressed in the existing literature [10] where only log2(n)
bits are leaked for a total of n accesses. A similar approach can
easily be applied to the current scheme.
In order to detect malicious tampering of the memory by the
adversary, we follow the standard denition of data integrity and
freshness [9]:
Denition 2.2. (Write-Only ORAM Integrity) From the pro-
cessor’s perspective, the ORAM behaves like a valid memory with
overwhelming probability, and detects any violation to data authen-
ticity and/or freshness.
Algorithm 1 Montgomery Ladder
Inputs: д, k = (kt−1, · · · ,k0)2 Output: y = дk
Start:
R0 ← 1; R1 ← д
for j = t − 1, 0 do
if kj = 0 then R1 ← R0R1; R0 ← (R0)2
else R0 ← R0R1; R1 ← (R1)2
end if
end for
return R0
2.1 Practicality of the Adversarial Model
Modular exponentiation algorithms, such as RSA algorithm, are
widely used in public-key cryptography. In general, these algo-
rithms perform computations of the form y = дk mod n, where
the aacker’s goal is to nd the secret k . Algorithm 1 shows the
Montgomery Ladder scheme [19] which performs exponentiation
(дk ) through simple square-and-multiply operations. For a given in-
put д and a secret key k , the algorithm performs multiplication and
squaring operations on two local variables R0 and R1 for each bit of
k starting from the most signicant bit down to the least signicant
bit. is algorithm prevents leakage over power side-channel since,
regardless of the value of bit kj , the same number of operations
are performed in the same order, hence producing the same power
footprint for kj = 0 and kj = 1.
Notice, however, that the specic order in which R0 and R1 are
updated in time depends upon the value of kj . E.g., for kj = 0, R1 is
wrien rst and then R0 is updated; whereas for kj = 1 the updates
are done in the reverse order. is sequence of write access to R0
and R1 reveals to the adversary the exact bit values of the secret key
k . A recent work [27] demonstrated such an aack where frequent
memory snapshots of victim application’s data (particularly R0
and R1) from the physical memory are taken via a compromised
DMA. ese snapshots are then correlated in time to determine the
sequence of write access to R0, R1, which in turn reveals the secret
key. e reported time taken by the aack is 3.5 minutes.
One might argue that under write-back caches, the updates to
application’s data will only be visible in DRAM once the data is
evicted from the LLC. is will denitely introduce noise to the
precise write-access sequence discussed earlier, hence making the
aacker’s job dicult. However, he can still collect several ‘noisy’
sequences of memory snapshots and then run correlation analysis
on them to nd the secret key k . Furthermore, if the adversary is
also a user of the same computer system, he can ush the system
caches frequently to reduce the noise in write-access sequence even
further.
3 BACKGROUND OF OBLIVIOUS RAMS
A fully functional Oblivious RAM [12], or more commonly known
as ORAM, is a primitive that obfuscates the user’s (i.e. Processor’s)
access paerns to a storage (i.e. DRAM) such that by monitoring the
memory access paerns, an adversary is not able to learn anything
about the data being accessed. e ORAM interface transforms
the user’s access sequence of program addresses into a sequence
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of ORAM accesses to random looking physical addresses. Since
the physical locations being accessed are revealed to the adversary,
the ORAM interface guarantees that the physical access paern is
independent of the logical access paern hence user’s potentially
data dependent access paerns are not revealed. Furthermore, the
data stored in ORAMs should be encrypted using probabilistic
encryption to conceal the data content as well as the fact whether
or not the content has been updated.
3.1 Path ORAM
Path ORAM [37] is currently the most ecient and well studied
ORAM implementation for secure processors. It has two main hard-
ware components: the binary tree storage and the ORAM controller.
Binary tree stores the data content of the ORAM and is imple-
mented on DRAM. Each node in the tree can hold up to Z useful
data blocks, and any empty slots are lled with dummy blocks. All
blocks, real or dummy, are probabilistically encrypted and cannot
be distinguished. e path from the root node to the leaf s is de-
ned as path s . ORAM controller is a piece of trusted hardware
that controls the tree structure. Besides necessary logic circuits,
the ORAM controller contains two main structures, a position map
and a stash. e position map is a lookup table that associates the
program address a of a data block with a path in the ORAM tree
(path s). e stash is a buer that stores up to a small number of
data blocks at a time.
Each data block a in Path ORAM is mapped (randomly) to some
path s via the position map, i.e. at any time, the data block a must
be stored either on path s , or in the stash. Path ORAM follows
the following steps when a request on block a is issued by the
processor: (1) e path (leaf) number s of the logical address a is
looked up in the position map. (2) All the blocks on path s are read
and decrypted, and all real blocks added to the stash. (3) Block a is
returned to the processor. (4) e position map of a is updated to a
new random leaf s ′. (5) As many blocks from stash as possible are
encrypted and wrien on path s , where empty spots are lled with
dummy blocks. Step (4) guarantees that when block a is accessed
later, a random path will be accessed which is independent of any
previously accessed paths (unlinkability). As a result, each ORAM
access is random and unlinkable regardless of the request paern.
Path ORAM incurs signicant energy and performance penalties
compared to insecure DRAM. Under typical seings for secure
processors (gigabytes of memory and 64- to 128-byte blocks), Path
ORAM has a 20-30 level binary tree where each node typically
stores 3 or 4 data blocks [32, 36]. is means that each ORAM
access reads and writes 60-120 blocks, in contrast to a single read
or write operation in an insecure storage system.
3.2 Write-Only ORAMs
In contrast to fully functional ORAMs, a write-only ORAM only ob-
fuscates the paerns of write accesses made to a storage. Write-only
ORAM is preferred for performance reasons over fully functional
ORAMs in situations where the adversary is not able to monitor
the read access paerns.
ere has been very limited research work done so far to ex-
plore write-only ORAMs, and to best of our knowledge, write-only
ORAMs for secure processors have not been explored at all. Li
and Daa [20] present a write-only ORAM scheme to be used with
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) in order to preserve the pri-
vacy of data outsourced to a data center. Although this scheme
achieves an amortized write cost ofO(B logN ), it incurs a read cost
of O(B.N ) for a storage of N blocks each of size B. For ecient
reads, it requires the client side storage (i.e. the on-chip position
map) to be polynomial in N . In a secure processor seing, DRAM
reads are usually the major performance boleneck, and introduc-
ing a complexity polynomial in N on this critical path is highly
unwanted.
A recent work, HIVE [2], has proposed a write-only ORAM
scheme for hidden volumes in hard disk drives. Although HIVE
write-only ORAM presented-as-is [2] targets a totally dierent
application, we believe that its parameter seings can be tweaked
to be used in the secure processor seing. is paper is the rst
one to implement HIVE in the secure processor context, and we
consider this implementation as the baseline write-only ORAM to
be compared with our proposed Flat ORAM.
Roche et al. [33] have also proposed an ecient write-only
ORAM scheme for hard disk storages. is scheme along with
its complex optimizations has been implemented in soware which
is completely feasible at the DRAM-Disk boundary. However, in
this work, we target the Processor-DRAM boundary for our pro-
posed ORAM which needs to be implemented in hardware, and
hence our focus is only towards simplied algorithms and opti-
mizations which can easily be synthesized in hardware without
substantial area overhead.
4 FLAT ORAM SCHEME
In this section, we rst present the core algorithm of Flat ORAM,
then we discuss its architectural details and various optimizations
for a practical implementation.
4.1 Fundamental Data Structures
Position Map (PosMap): It is a standard Path ORAM structure
that maintains randomized mappings of logical blocks to physical
locations. However there is one subtle dierence between PosMap
of Path ORAM and Flat ORAM. In Path ORAM, PosMap stores a path
number for each logical block and the block can reside anywhere
on that path. In contrast, PosMap in Flat ORAM stores the exact
physical address where a logical block is stored.
Occupancy Map (OccMap): OccMap is a newly introduced struc-
ture in Flat ORAM. It is essentially a large bit-mask where each bit
corresponds to a physical location (i.e., a cache line). e binary
value of each bit represents whether the corresponding physical
block contains real or outdated/dummy data. OccMap is of crucial
importance to avoid data collisions, and hence for the correctness
of Flat ORAM. A collision happens when a physical location, which
is randomly chosen to store a logical block, already contains useful
data which cannot be overwrien. Managing the OccMap securely
and eciently is a major challenge which we address in section 5
in detail.
Stash: Stash, also adapted from Path ORAM, is a small buer
in the trusted memory to temporarily hold data blocks evicted
from the processor’s last level cache (LLC). A slight but crucial
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Algorithm 2 Flat ORAM Initialization.
1: procedure Initialize( N ,B, P )
2: PosMap := {⊥}N . Empty Position Map.
3: OccMap := {0}P . Empty Occupancy Map.
4: for j ∈ {1, · · · ,N } do
5: loop
6: r ← UniformRand(1, · · · , P )
7: if OccMap[r ] == 0 then . If vacant
8: OccMap[r ] := 1 . Mark Occupied.
9: PosMap[j] := r . Record position.
10: break
11: end if
12: end loop
13: end for
14: end procedure
modication, however, is that Flat ORAM only buers dirty3 data
blocks in the stash; while clean blocks evicted from the LLC are
simply ignored since a valid copy of these blocks already exists in
the main memory. is modication is signicantly benecial for
performance.
4.2 Basic Algorithm
Let N be the total number of logical data blocks that we want to
securely store in our ORAM, which is implemented on top of a
DRAM; and let each data block be of size B bytes. Let P be the
number of physical blocks that our DRAM can physically store, i.e.
the DRAM capacity (where P ≥ N ).
Initial Setup: Algorithm 2 shows the setup phase of our scheme.
Two null-initialized arrays PosMap and OccMap, corresponding to
position and occupancy map of size N and P entries respectively,
are allocated. For now, we assume that both PosMap and OccMap
reside on-chip in the trusted memory to which the adversary has
no access. However, since these arrays can be quite large and the
trusted memory is quite constrained, we later on show how this
problem is solved. Initially, since all physical blocks are empty, each
OccMap entry is set to 0. Now, each logical block is mapped to a
uniformly random physical block, i.e. PosMap is initialized, while
avoiding any collisions using OccMap. e OccMap is updated
along the way in order to mark those physical locations which have
been assigned to a logical block as ‘occupied’. Notice that in order
to minimize the probability of collision, P should be suciently
larger than N , e.g. P ≈ 2N gives a 50% collision probability.
Reads: e procedures to read/write a data block corresponding
to the virtual address a from/to the ORAM are shown in Algo-
rithm 3. A read operation is straightforward as it does not need to
be obfuscated. e PosMap entry for the logical block a is looked
up, and the encrypted data is read through normal DRAM read. e
data is decrypted and returned to the LLC along with its current
physical position s . e location s is stored in the tag array of the
LLC, and proves to be useful upon eviction of the data from the
LLC.
Writes: Since write operations should be non-blocking in a se-
cure processor seing, the ORAM writes are performed in two
3Blocks with modied data.
Algorithm 3 Basic Flat ORAM considering all PosMap and Oc-
cMap is on-chip. Following procedures show reading, writing and
eviction of a logical block a from the ORAM.
1: procedure ORAMRead(a)
2: s := PosMap[a] . Lookup position
3: data := DecK(DRAMRead(s))
4: return (s,data) . Position is also returned.
5: end procedure
1: procedure ORAMWrite(a, sold,data)
2: Stash := Stash ∪ {(a, sold,data)} . Add to Stash
3: return
4: end procedure
1: procedure EvictStash
2: (a, sold,data) ← Stash . Read from Stash
3: loop
4: snew ← UniformRand(1, · · · , P )
5: if OccMap[snew] == 0 then . If vacant
6: OccMap[snew] := 1 . Mark as Occupied.
7: OccMap[sold] := 0 . Vacate old block.
8: PosMap[a] := snew . Record position.
9: DRAMWrite(snew, EncK(data))
10: Stash := Stash \ {(a, sold,data)}
11: break
12: else . If occupied.
13: data′ := DecK(DRAMRead(snew))
14: DRAMWrite(snew, EncK(data′))
15: end if
16: end loop
17: end procedure
steps. Whenever a data block is evicted from the LLC, it is rst
simply added to the stash queue, without incurring any latency.
While the processor moves on to computing on other data in its reg-
isters/caches, the ORAM controller then works in the background
to evict the block from stash to the DRAM. A block a to be wrien
is picked from the stash, and a new uniformly random physical
position snew is chosen for this block. e OccMap is looked up
to determine whether the location snew is vacant. If so, the write
operation proceeds by simply recording the new position snew for
block a in PosMap, updating the OccMap entries for snew and sold
accordingly, and nally writing encrypted data at location snew.
Otherwise if the location snew is already occupied by some useful
data block, the probability of which is N /P , the existing data block
is read, decrypted, re-encrypted4 under probabilistic encryption
and wrien back. A new random position is then chosen for the
block a and the above mentioned process is repeated until a vacant
location is found to evict the block. Notice that storing sold along
with the data upon reads will save extra ORAM accesses to lookup
sold from the recursive PosMap (cf. Section 4.5).
4We assume that the encryption/decryption algorithms EncK/DecK implement proba-
bilistic encryption, e.g. AES counter mode, as done in prior works [9, 32].
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4.3 Avoiding Redundant Memory Accesses
e fact that the adversary cannot see read accesses allows Flat
ORAM to avoid almost all the redundancy incurred by a fully func-
tional ORAM (e.g. Path ORAM). Instead of reading/writing a whole
path for each read/write access as done in Path ORAM, Flat ORAM
simply reads/writes only the desired block directly given its phys-
ical location from the PosMap. is is fundamentally where the
write-only ORAMs (i.e. HIVE [2], Flat ORAM) get the performance
edge over the fully functional ORAMs. However, the question arises
whether Flat ORAM is still secure aer eliminating the redundant
accesses.
4.4 Security
Privacy: Consider any two logical write-access sequences O0 and
O1 of the same length. In EvictStash procedure (cf. Algorithm 3),
a physical block chosen uniformly at random out of P blocks is al-
ways modied regardless of it being vacant or occupied. erefore,
the write accesses generated by Flat ORAM while executing either
of the two logical access sequences O0 and O1 will update mem-
ory locations uniformly at random throughout the whole physical
memory space. As a result, an adversary monitoring these updates
cannot distinguish between real vs. dummy blocks, and in turn the
two sequences O0 and O1 seem computationally indistinguishable.
Furthermore, notice that in Path ORAM the purpose of accessing
a whole path instead of just one block upon each read and write
access is to prevent linkability between a write and a following read
access to the same logical block. In Flat ORAM’s model, however,
since the adversary cannot see the read accesses at all, therefore the
linkability problem would never arise as long as each logical data
block is wrien to a new random location every time it is evicted
(which is guaranteed by Flat ORAM algorithm). Although HIVE
proposes a constant k-factor redundancy upon each data write, we
argue that it is unnecessary for the desired security as explained
above, and can be avoided to gain performance.
Hence, the basic algorithm of Flat ORAM presented above guar-
antees the desired privacy property of our write-only ORAM (cf.
Denition 2.1).
Integrity: Next, we move on to making the basic Flat ORAM
practical for a real system. e main challenge is to get rid of
the huge on-chip memory requirements imposed by PosMap and
OccMap. While addressing the PosMap management problem, we
discuss an existing ecient memory integrity verication technique
from Path ORAM domain called PMMAC [9] (cf. Section 6.2) which
satises our integrity denition (cf. Denition 2.2).
Stash Management: Another critical missing piece is to pre-
vent the unlikely event of stash overow for a small constant sized
stash, as such an event could break the privacy guarantees oered
by Flat ORAM. We completely eliminate the possibility of a stash
overow event by using a proven technique called Background Evic-
tion [32]. We present a detailed discussion about the stash size
under Background Eviction technique in Section 5.4.
4.5 Recursive Position Map & PLB
In order to squeeze the on-chip PosMap size, a standard recursive
construction of position map [35] is used. In a 2-level recursive
position map, for instance, the original PosMap structure is stored
in another set of data blocks which we call a hierarchy of position
map, and the PosMap of the rst hierarchy is stored in the trusted
memory on-chip (Figure 1). e above trick can be repeated, i.e.,
adding more hierarchies of position map to further reduce the nal
position map size at the expense of increased latency. Notice that
all the position map hierarchies (except for the nal position map)
are stored in the untrusted DRAM along with the actual data blocks,
and can be treated as regular data blocks; this technique is called
Unied ORAM [9].
Unied ORAM scheme reduces the performance penalty of re-
cursion by caching position map ORAM blocks in a Position map
Lookaside Buer (PLB) to exploit locality (similar to the TLB ex-
ploiting locality in page tables). To hide whether a position map
access hits or misses in the cache, Unied ORAM stores both data
and position map blocks in the same binary tree. Further compres-
sion of PosMap structure is done by using Compressed Position
Map technique discussed in section 6.1.
4.6 Background Eviction
Stash (cf. Section 4.1) is a small buer to temporarily hold the
dirty data blocks evicted from the LLC/PLB. If at any time, the rate
of blocks being added to the stash becomes higher than the rate
of evictions from the stash, the blocks may accumulate in stash
causing a stash overow. Background eviction [32] is a proven
and secure technique proposed for Path ORAM to prevent stash
overow. e key idea of background evictions is to temporarily
stop serving the real requests (which increase stash occupancy)
and issue background evictions or so-called dummy accesses (which
decrease stash occupancy) when the stash is full.
We use background eviction technique to eliminate the possi-
bility of a stash overow event. When the stash is full, the ORAM
controller suspends the read requests which consequently stops
any write-back requests preventing the stash occupancy to increase
further. en it simply chooses random locations and, if vacant,
evicts the blocks from the stash until the stash occupancy is reduced
to a safe threshold. e probability of a successful eviction in each
aempt is determined by the DRAM utilization parameter, i.e. the
ratio of occupied blocks to the total blocks in DRAM. In our exper-
iments, we choose a utilization of ≈ 1/2, therefore each eviction
aempt has ≈ 50% probability of success. Note that background
evictions essentially push the problem of stash overow to the
program’s termination channel. Conguring the DRAM utilization
to be less than 1 guarantees the termination, and we demonstrate
good performance for a utilization of 1/2 in Section 7. Although it
is true that background eviction may have dierent eect on the
total runtime for dierent applications, or even for dierent inputs
for the same application which leak the information about data
locality etc. However, the same argument applies to Path ORAM
based systems, and also for other system components as well, such
as enabling vs. disabling branch prediction or the L3 cache etc.
Protecting any leakage through the program’s termination time is
out of scope of this paper (cf. Section 2).
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4.7 Periodic ORAM
As mentioned in our adversarial model, the core denition of ORAM
[12] do not leakage over ORAM timing or termination channel (cf.
Section 2). Likewise, the fundamental algorithm of Flat ORAM
(Algorithm 3) does not target to prevent these leakages. erefore in
order to protect the ORAM timing channel, we adapt the Flat ORAM
algorithm to issue periodic ORAM accesses, while maintaining its
security guarantees.
In the literature, periodic variants of Path ORAM have been
presented [11] which simply always issue ORAM requests at regular
periodic intervals. However, under write-only ORAMs, such a
straightforward periodic approach would break the security as
explained below. Since in write-only ORAMs, the read requests do
not leave a trace, therefore for a logical access sequence of (Write,
Read, Write), the adversary will only see two writes occurring
at times 0 and 2T for T being the interval between two ORAM
accesses. e access at time T will be omied which reveals to the
adversary that a read request was made at this time.
To x this problem, we modify the Flat ORAM algorithm as
follows. Among the periodic access, for every real read request to
physical block s , another randomly chosen physical block s ′ is also
read. Block s is consumed by the processor, whereas block s ′ is
re-encrypted (under probabilistic encryption) and wrien back to
the same location from where it was read. is would always result
in update(s) to the memory aer each and every time period T .
Security: A few things should be noted: First, it does not maer
whether the location s ′ contains real or dummy data, because the
plain-text data content is never modied but just re-encrypted.
Second, writing back s ′ is indistinguishable from a real write request
as this location is chosen uniformly at random. ird, this write
to s ′ does not reveal any trace of the actual read of s as the two
locations are totally independent.
We present our simulation results for periodic Flat ORAM in the
evaluation section.
5 EFFICIENT COLLISION AVOIDANCE
In sections 4.3 and section 4.4, we discuss how Flat ORAM out-
performs Path ORAM by avoiding redundant memory accesses.
However, an immediate consequence of this is the problem of col-
lisions which now becomes the main performance boleneck. A
collision refers to a scenario when a physical location s , which is
randomly chosen to write a logical block a, already contains useful
data which cannot be overwrien. e overall eciency of such
a write-only ORAM scheme boils down to its collision avoidance
mechanism. In the following subsections, we discuss the occupancy
map based collision avoidance mechanism of Flat ORAM in detail
and compare it with HIVE’s inverse position map based collision
avoidance scheme.
5.1 Inverse Position Map Approach
Since a read access must not leave its trace in the memory in order
to avoid the linkability problem, a naive approach of marking the
physical location as ‘vacant’ by writing ‘dummy’ data to it upon
each read is not possible. HIVE [2] proposes an inverse position
map structure that maps each physical location to a logical address.
Before each write operation to a physical location s , a potential
collision check is performed which involves two steps. First the
logical address a linked to s is looked up via the inverse position
map. en the regular position map is looked up to nd out the
most recent physical location s ′ linked to the logical address a. If
s = s ′ then since the two mappings are synchronized, it shows that
s contains useful data, hence a collision has occurred. Otherwise, if
s , s ′ then this means that the entry for s in the inverse position
map is outdated, and block a has now moved to a new location
s ′. erefore, the current location can be overwrien, hence no
collision.
HIVE stores the encrypted inverse position map structure in
the untrusted storage at a xed location. With each physical block
being updated, the corresponding inverse position map entry is
also updated. Since write-only ORAMs do not hide the physical
block ID of the updated block, therefore revealing the position of
the corresponding inverse position map entry does not leak any
secret information.
We demonstrate in our evaluations that the large size of inverse
position map approach introduces storage as well as performance
overheads. For a system with a block size of B bytes and total N
logical blocks, inverse position map requires log2(N ) additional
bits space for each of the P physical blocks. Crucially, this large size
of a single inverse position map entry restricts the total number of
entries per block to a small constant, which leads to less locality
within a block. is results in performance degradation.
5.2 Occupancy Map Approach
In the simplied OccMap based approach, each of the P physical
blocks requires just one additional bit to store the occupancy infor-
mation (vacant/occupied). In terms of storage, this gives log2(N )
times improvement over HIVE.
5.2.1 Insecurely Managing the Occupancy Map. e OccMap
array bits are rst sliced into chunks equal to the ORAM block size
(B bytes). We call these chunks the OccMap Blocks. Notice that
each OccMap block contains occupancy information of 8B physical
locations (i.e. 8 bits per byte; 1-bit per location). Now the challenge
is to eciently store these blocks somewhere o-chip. A naive
approach would be to encrypt OccMap blocks under probabilistic
encryption, and store them contiguously in a dedicated xed area
in DRAM. However under Flat ORAM algorithm, this approach
would lead to a serious security aw which is explained below.
If the OccMap blocks are stored contiguously at a xed location in
DRAM, an adversary can easily identify the corresponding OccMap
block for a given a physical address; and for a given OccMap block,
he can identify the contiguous range of corresponding 8B physical
locations. With that in mind, when a data block a (previously read
from sold) is evicted from the stash and wrien to location snew (cf.
Algorithm 3), the old OccMap entry is marked as ‘vacant’ and the
new OccMap entry is marked as ‘occupied’; i.e. two OccMap blocks
Oold and Onew are updated. Furthermore, the snew location, which
falls in the contiguous range covered by one of the two updated
OccMap blocks, is also updated with the actual data – thereby
revealing the identity of Onew. is reveals to the adversary that a
logical data block was previously read from some location within
the small contiguous range covered by Oold, and it is now wrien
to location snew (i.e. coarse grained linkability). Recording several
such instances of read-write access pairs and linking them together
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Figure 1: Logical view of OccMap organization.
in a chain reveals the precise paern of movement of logical block
a across the whole memory.
5.2.2 SecurelyManaging the OccupancyMap. To avoid this prob-
lem, we treat the OccMap blocks as regular data blocks, i.e., OccMap
blocks are encrypted and also randomly distributed throughout the
whole DRAM, and tracked by the regular PosMap. Figure 1 shows
the logical organization of data, PosMap and OccMap blocks. e
OccMap blocks are added as ‘additional’ data blocks at the data
hierarchy (Hierarchy 0). en the recursive position map hierar-
chies are constructed on top of the complete data set (data blocks
and OccMap blocks). Every time an OccMap block is updated, it is
mapped to a new random location and hence avoids the linkability
problem. We realize that this approach results in overall more po-
sition map blocks, however for practical parameters seings (e.g.
128B block size, 8GB DRAM, 4GB working set), it does not result in
an additional PosMap hierarchy. erefore the recursive position
map lookup latency is unaected.
5.3 Performance Related Optimizations
Now that we have discussed how to securely store the occupancy
map, we move on to discuss some performance related optimiza-
tions implemented in Flat ORAM.
5.3.1 Locality in OccMap Blocks. For realistic parameters, e.g.
128 bytes block size, each OccMap block contains occupancy infor-
mation of 1024 physical locations. is factor is termed as OccMap
scaling factor. e dense structure of OccMap blocks oers an op-
portunity to exploit spatial locality within a block. In other words,
for a large scaling factor it is more likely that two randomly chosen
physical locations will be covered by the same OccMap block, as
compared to a small scaling factor. In order to also benet from
such locality, we cache the OccMap blocks as well in PLB along with
the PosMap blocks. For a fair comparison with HIVE in our experi-
ments, we also model the caching of HIVE’s inverse position map
blocks in PLB. Our experiments conrm that the OccMap blocks
show a higher PLB hit rate as compared to HIVE’s inverse position
map blocks cached in PLB in the same manner. e reason is that,
for the same parameters, the scaling factor of inverse position map
approach is just about 40 which results in a larger size of the data
structure and hence more capacity-misses from the PLB.
5.3.2 Dirty vs. Clean Evictions from LLC & PLB. An eviction of
a block from the LLC where the data content of the block has not
been modied is called a clean eviction, whereas an eviction where
the data has been modied is called dirty eviction. In Path ORAM,
since all the read operations also need to be obfuscated, therefore
following a read operation, when a block gets evicted from the LLC,
it must be re-wrien to a new random location even if its data is
unmodied, i.e. a clean eviction. is is crucial for Path ORAM’s
security as it guarantees that successive reads to the same logical
block result in random paths being accessed. is notion is termed
as read-erase, which assumes that the data will be erased from the
memory once it is read.
In write-only ORAMs, however, since the read access paerns
are not revealed therefore the notion of read-erase is not necessary.
A data block can be read from the same location as oen as needed
as long as it’s contents are not modied. We implement this relaxed
model in Flat ORAM which greatly improves performance. Essen-
tially, upon a clean eviction from the LLC, the block can simply
be discarded since one useful copy of the data is still stored in the
DRAM. Same reasoning applies to the clean evictions from the PLB.
Only the dirty evictions are added to the stash to be wrien back
at a random location in the memory.
5.4 Implications on PLB & Stash Size
Each dirty eviction requires not only the corresponding data block
to be updated but also the two related OccMAP blocks which store
the new and old occupancy information. In order to relocate these
blocks to new random positions, the ‘d’ hierarchies of correspond-
ing PosMAP blocks will need to be updated and this in turn implies
updating their related OccMAP blocks, and so on. If not prevented,
this avalanche eect will repeatedly ll the stash implying back-
ground evictions which stop serving real requests and increase
the termination time. For a large enough PLB with respect to a
benchmark’s locality, most of the required OccMAP blocks during
the benchmark’s execution will be in the PLB. is prevents the
avalanche eect most of the time (as our evaluation shows) since
the OccMAP blocks in PLB can be directly updated.
Even if all necessary OccMAP blocks are in PLB, a dirty eviction
still requires the data block with its d PosMAP blocks to be updated.
Each of these d + 1 blocks is successfully evicted from the stash
with probability 1/2, determined by the DRAM utilization, on each
aempt. e probability that exactlym aempts are needed to evict
all d +1 blocks is equal to
(m−1
d
)/2m . is probability becomes very
small for m equal to a small constant c times d logd . If the dirty
eviction rate (per DRAM access) is at most 1/c , then the stash size
will mostly be contained to a small size (e.g., 100 blocks for d = 4)
so that additional background eviction which stops serving real
requests is not needed.
Notice that the presented write-only ORAM is not asymptoti-
cally ecient: In order to show at most a constant factor increase
in termination time with overwhelming probability, a proper argu-
ment needs to show a small probability of requiring background
eviction which halts normal execution. An argument based on
M/D/1 queuing theory or 1-D random walks needs the OccMap to
be always within the PLB and this means that the eective stash
size as compared to Path ORAM’s stash denition includes this PLB
which scales linearly with N and is not O(loдN ).
6 ADOPTING MORE EXISTING TRICKS
Here we discuss a few more architectural optimizations from the
Path ORAM paradigm which can be awlessly incorporated and are
implemented in Flat ORAM for further improvements and features.
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6.1 Compressed Position Map
e recursive position map for a total of N logical data blocks
creates dlogb (N )e hierarchies of position map. Here b represents
the number of positions stored in one PosMap block, and is called
PosMap scale factor. A higher value of PosMap scale factor would
result in less number of PosMap hierarchies and hence yield beer
performance.
To achieve this goal, Compressed Position Map [9] has been
proposed, which results in less PosMap hierarchies than uncom-
pressed PosMap. e basic idea is to store a monotonically increas-
ing counter in the PosMap entry for each logical data block. is
counter along with the block’s logical address is used as a ‘seed’ to
a keyed pseudo-random function in order to compute a random po-
sition for the block. Every time a block is to be wrien, its PosMap
counter is rst incremented so that a new random position is gen-
erated by the pseudo-random function for the block. To compress
these counters to a feasible size, [9] presents an optimization us-
ing a big group counter and several small individual counters per
PosMap block. We refer the readers who might be interested in
more details to the above citation.
We tweak the compressed PosMap technique for Flat ORAM.
e key modication is that the counter for any block to be evicted
is incremented even upon unsuccessful eviction aempts, i.e. even
if a collision is detected. It is important because otherwise the
pseudo-random function will generate the same random location
over and over which is already occupied, and hence the block will
never be evicted.
6.2 Integrity Verication (PMMAC)
Flat ORAM also implements an ecient memory integrity veri-
cation technique termed as PosMap MAC (PMMAC) [9]. PMMAC
leverages the per-block counters of compressed PosMap to perform
MAC5 checks on the data upon reads. Suppose a logical block a has
a counter c , then upon writes, the ORAM controller computes a
MACh = MACK (a | | c | | data) using the secret keyK and writes the
tuple (h,data) to the DRAM. Upon reads, the potentially tampered
data tuple (h∗,data∗) is read. e ORAM controller recomputes
h = MACK (a | | c | | data∗) and checks whether h = h∗. If so, the
data integrity is veried. Also, since the counter is incremented
upon every write, the freshness of the data is also veried, i.e. in-
tegrity check guarantees that the most recently wrien data has
been read.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
7.1 Methodology
We use Graphite [28] to model dierent ORAM schemes in all
our experiments. Graphite simulates a tiled multi-core chip. e
hardware congurations are listed in Table 1. We assume there is
only one memory controller on the chip, and all ORAM accesses
are serialized. e DRAM in Graphite is simply modeled by a at
latency. e 16 GB/s is calculated assuming a 1 GHz chip with 128
pins and pins are the boleneck of the data transfer.
We use Splash-2 [46], SPEC06 [18] and two OLTP database man-
agement system (DBMS) [47] workloads namely YCSB [7] and
5Message Authentication Code (MAC), e.g. a keyed cryptographic hash, is a small
piece of information to verify the authenticity of a message/data.
Table 1: System Conguration.
Secure Processor Conguration
Core model 1 GHz, in order core
Total Cores 4
L1 I/D Cache 32 KB, 4-way
Shared L2 cache 512 KB per tile, 8-way
Cacheline (block) size 128bytes
DRAM bandwidth 16 GB/s
Conventional DRAM latency 100 cycles
Default ORAM Conguration
ORAM Capacity 8 GB
Working Set Size 4 GB
Number of ORAM hierarchies 4
ORAM Block size 128 Bytes
PLB Size 32kB
Stash Size 100 Blocks
Compressed PosMap & Integrity Enabled
TPCC [41] to evaluate our Flat ORAM scheme (flat oram) against
various baselines. ree baseline designs are used for comparison:
the insecure baseline using normal DRAM (dram), the state of the
art Path ORAM with dynamic prefetching [48] (path oram) and
an adaptation of the write-only ORAM scheme from HIVE (hive)
in the context of secure processor architectures with several addi-
tional optimizations. For all ORAM schemes, we enable the PLB,
the compressed position map and integrity verication. e de-
fault parameters for ORAM schemes are shown in Table 1. Unless
otherwise stated, all the experiments use these ORAM parameters.
7.2 Performance Comparison
Although all ORAM schemes incur performance slowdown over
DRAM, however it is important to note that this slowdown is pro-
portional to the memory intensiveness of the application. Memory
bound applications suer from higher performance degradation
than compute bound applications. Figure 2a, Figure 2b and Fig-
ure 2c show normalized completion times (shown by solid bars) of
Splash2, SPEC06 and DBMS benchmarks with respect to DRAM.
Splash2 and SPEC06 benchmarks are sorted in ascending order
of slowdowns over DRAM from le to right. We consider all the
benchmarks with less than 2× overhead as Computation Intensive
benchmarks (ploed over green background) and all those with
more than 2× overhead as Memory Intensive benchmarks (ploed
over red background).
Clearly, Path ORAM incurs the highest overhead, as expected,
among all three ORAM schemes because it is a fully functional
ORAM which provides higher security. However, the point of
presenting this comparison is to convince the readers that using
Path ORAM for only write-access protection is indeed an overkill
when beer alternatives (e.g. HIVE, Flat ORAM) exist. On average,
Path ORAM incurs about 8.6× slowdown for Splash2 and 5.3×
for SPEC06 memory intensive benchmarks (mem avg). TPCC and
YCSB incur 7.2× and 9.3× slowdowns respectively.
HIVE also shows signicant performance degradation
compared to Flat ORAM for memory intensive benchmarks
(ocean contiguous, ocean non contiguous, mcf, tpcc, ycsb). e
average slowdown of HIVE adaptation for memory bound Splash2
and SPEC06 workloads even aer several additional optimizations
, , Syed Kamran Haider and Marten van Dijk
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Figure 2: Normalized Completion Time and Memory Ac-
cesses with respect to Insecure DRAM.
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Figure 3: Overall PLB Hit Rate (PosMap blocks and OccMap
blocks).
is 5× and 2.2× respectively. Whereas Flat ORAM outperforms
HIVE by up to 50% performance gain on average, having respective
average slowdowns of 2× and 1.6×. For DBMS, the performance
gain of Flat ORAM over HIVE approach up to 75%.
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Figure 4: Sweep Physical DRAM Capacity.
is performance gap is primarily because the inverse position
map approach of HIVE results in signicantly increased number of
additional DRAM accesses. Figure 2 also shows normalized total
number of DRAM accesses w.r.t. insecure DRAM system (shown by
red markers) for HIVE and Flat ORAM. ese numbers include both
the DRAM accesses issued to serve regular ORAM requests and
also the ones caused by background evictions (cf. Section 4.6). e
normalized access count for Path ORAM is around 200 on average,
and is not shown on the plots. It can be seen that HIVE issues 8.2
and 4.2 DRAM accesses as opposed to Flat ORAM’s 4.8 and 2.3
accesses on average for each request issued by the processor for
memory intensive Splash2 and SPEC06 workloads respectively.
e reason for higher number of DRAM accesses from HIVE can
be found in Figure 3 which shows the overall PLB hit rate of both
HIVE and Flat ORAM. e large memory footprint of the HIVE’s
inverse position map structure results in overall more data being
inserted into the PLB and hence translates into higher number of
evictions from PLB. Consequently the ORAM controller experiences
higher number of PLB misses and issues relatively higher number
of DRAM accesses. Whereas the dense structure of OccMap oers
a smaller memory footprint, thus causing less PLB evictions and
exhibiting beer locality (cf. Section 5.3) which directly translates
into performance gain.
e normalized number of DRAM accesses is proportional to
the energy consumption of the memory subsystem. I.e., a higher
number of DRAM accesses would result in more energy consump-
tion. On average, Flat ORAM saves up to 80% energy over HIVE
for various workloads.
7.3 Sensitivity Study
In this section, we will study how dierent parameters in the system
aect the performance of write-only ORAMs.
DRAM Utilization: When a block needs to be wrien to the
DRAM, a random position is chosen and if that location is vacant,
the block is wrien at that location (cf. Section 4.2). e probability
that a randomly chosen location is ‘vacant’ is determined by the
DRAM utilization, i.e. the ratio of occupied blocks to total blocks
in DRAM. In order to study the eect of DRAM utilization, we
show the results of various physical DRAM sizes (8, 16, 32GB) for
a constant working set of 4GB in Figure 4. e resulting DRAM
utilizations are 50%, 25% and 12.5% respectively.
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Figure 5: Sweep Stash Size.
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Figure 6: Sweep DRAM latency.
Going from 50% to 25% utilization, memory intensive bench-
marks (ycsb) gain performance, as the collisions during write oper-
ations are reduced by half. However, the jump from 25% to 12.5%
utilization yields lile gain because the collision probability of 25%
at 16GB mark is already too low to be a major performance bot-
tleneck. Notice that HIVE benets more compared to Flat ORAM
from the reduced collisions since it has a much higher collision-
penalty. Since less memory intensive benchmarks (sjeng) are not
constrained by write operations anyway, lower utilizations do not
help much.
Stash Size: As discussed in Section 4.6, when the stash occupancy
increases than a particular threshold, the ORAM starts perform-
ing ‘background evictions’. Since background evictions cause the
real requests to be suspended temporarily, frequent background
evictions cause performance degradation. A larger stash is less
likely to become full and thus reduces background eviction rate
and improves performance.
In Figure 5, the stash size is swept for two dierent benchmarks,
one is highly memory intensive (ocean non contiguous) and the
other one is signicantly less memory bound (sjeng). e memory
intensive benchmark benets from a large stash, as it experiences
high background evictions rate at lower stash sizes. e less mem-
ory intensive benchmark does not benet much from increased
stash sizes, as it already has a low background evictions rate. In
general, Flat ORAM shows signicant performance gain over HIVE
even at small stash sizes.
DRAM Latency & Bandwidth: In Path ORAM, each ORAM ac-
cess results in about 200 DRAM accesses on average under typical
parameter seings. Most of these accesses can be issued in a burst
without waiting for the rst data block to arrive, since the addresses
are known a priori, e.g. accessing a full path. erefore, the DRAM
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Figure 7: Sweep DRAM bandwidth.
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Figure 8: Periodic ORAM accesses. Normalized w.r.t. Inse-
cure DRAM. ORAM Period = 100 cycles.
bandwidth becomes the main boleneck in Path ORAM, whereas
the DRAM latency plays less signicant role as it is incurred less
oen.
However, the write-only ORAMs under consideration typically
only issue less than 10 DRAM accesses per ORAM access (cf. Sec-
tion 7.2). Furthermore, there could be interdependencies within
these 10 accesses, e.g., reading an OccMap block to nd out if a
position is vacant, and then issuing further writes in case a va-
cant position is found. In such cases, DRAM latency is incurred
more oen and hence plays more prominent role in the overall
performance than the DRAM bandwidth.
is phenomenon is shown in DRAM latency and bandwidth
sweep studies in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively. Memory inten-
sive benchmarks (ocean contiguous) are more sensitive to DRAM
latency and experience more performance degradation at higher
latencies. On the other hand, compute bound benchmarks (sjeng)
are less sensitive to the DRAM latency. Increasing the DRAM band-
width seems to help only a lile as expected and explained in the
discussion above.
Periodic ORAM:. Figure 8 shows the experimental results of pe-
riodic write-only ORAM schemes. e results are normalized to
insecure DRAM. e period in terms of number of cycles between
, , Syed Kamran Haider and Marten van Dijk
two consecutive ORAM accesses is chosen to be 100 cycles. In gen-
eral, adding periodicity to our ORAM scheme does not signicantly
hurt performance.
8 CONCLUSION
We propose an ecient and practical write-only Oblivious RAM
scheme called Flat ORAM for secure processor architectures. It
is the rst write-only ORAM with a concrete implementation in
secure processors domain. e implementation details are discussed
and the design space is comprehensively explored. On memory
intensive Splash-2 and SPEC06 benchmarks, Flat ORAM only incurs
on average 3× and 1.6× slowdown respectively. Compared to a
closest related work in the literature, Flat ORAM oers up to 75%
higher performance and 80% energy savings.
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